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TWO FOOTNOTES TO GARVEY AND
CONEY: A DILEMMA ABOUT MATERIAL
COOPERATION, AND A CONCERN
ABOUT THE NOMINATION PROCESS
MARK V. TUSHNET*
I can only offer two footnotes to John Garvey and Amy Coney's
splendid discussion of the obligation, if any, of Catholic judges to recuse
themselves in death penalty cases.1 Much of their article describes the
Catholic position on the death penalty, the nature and scope of an or-
thodox Catholic's obligation to act in compliance with that position, and
the distinction drawn in Catholic moral teaching between formal and
material cooperation with evil. I am an outsider to the tradition in
which these discussions have taken place, but my first footnote is that,
as I understand that tradition, Garvey and Coney appear to have omit-
ted discussion of a consideration that seems relevant to the analysis of
whether an orthodox Catholic judge materially cooperates in the ad-
ministration of the death penalty. That consideration is the dilemma
that the very possibility of recusal poses.
The dilemma may arise in several settings, but here I deal with it in
its simplest forms. Consider first the judge (I omit in what follows the
obvious modifier, "orthodox Catholic") who would preside over the
guilt phase in a case in which the prosecutor has filed a notice of inten-
tion to seek the death penalty. Garvey and Coney argue that this judge
need not recuse himself or herself because merely presiding at the guilt
phase is material cooperation that, on balance, is insufficient to support
the conclusion that the judge has acted immorally. Suppose, however,
that the judge believes that death penalty cases are characterized by a
higher rate of trial error in the guilt phase than non-capital cases. Sup-
pose that this belief is based on the notion that the pressures on prose-
cutors to obtain convictions that will support death sentences induce
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overreaching and the notion that the pressures on defense attorneys in-
duce a kind of fatalistic paralysis that leads them to sloppy behavior.2
Further, suppose the judge believes that appellate courts scrutinize
claimed errors in the guilt phase of capital cases more closely, on the
ground, perhaps unconsciously held, that "death is different. 3 The trial
judge is of course conscientious, and will conduct any trial in a way that
makes it as error-free as possible. If the judge's scrupulous actions
during the trial's guilt phase produce a record free of error and the jury
convicts, the judge will have increased the probability that a death sen-
tence, if imposed at the penalty phase, will be carried out.' As I under-
stand Garvey and Coney's description of Catholic moral teaching, ac-
tions that increase the probability of evil actually occurring constitute
material cooperation with evil. The judge who presides over the guilt
phase of a capital trial therefore provides material cooperation through
his or her efforts to make the trial as error-free as possible.
Recusal, however, does not eliminate the problem of material coop-
eration, although it may attenuate it." Suppose the judge believes that
the "substitute" judge-the one who will be called on to preside if the
judge recuses himself or herself-is likely to allow more errors during
the trial.' In itself, this would decrease the probability that a death sen-
tence, if imposed, would be carried out. Unfortunately, a simple in-
crease in trial errors may have two offsetting effects: The errors may
2. Indeed, the judge might believe that this ineradicable error rate is an important fea-
ture of death penalty cases supporting the conclusion that the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional as well as immoral.
3. To me that conclusion seems well-supported by the Supreme Court's decisions about
criminal procedure-trial error-during the 1950s and 1960s.
4. I simply note the possibility that a prosecutor, concerned that this judge will be over-
scrupulous because of the judge's agreement with Catholic doctrine, might seek to remove
the judge. Garvey and Coney do not analyze whether a judge-specific motion to recuse
should be granted, devoting their attention instead to the question of whether the judge's re-
ligion alone supports such a motion.
5. As I understand the relevant moral teaching, the attenuation occurs because the
judge's actions in recusing are even more remote from the evil than participating in the trial's
guilt phase. See James F. Keenan, S.J., Cooperation, Principle of, in NEW DICTIONARY OF
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 232,234 (Judith A. Dwyer ed., 1994).
6. If the substitute judge is likely to make fewer errors, recusal increases the probability
that a death sentence, if imposed, will be carried out, over such probability if the judge him-
self or herself presides. To me, the analysis seems to me the same, although the degree of
material cooperation is of course smaller. (I should note that my unfamiliarity with Catholic
moral teaching makes me uncomfortable in suggesting that material cooperation comes in
sizes like "large" and "small.") To the extent that Catholic moral teaching requires some
sort of on-balance judgment, however, some metaphor implicating size or weight seems in-
evitable. According to Keenan, supra note 4, at some points in the moral analysis, "a consid-
erable weighing of values occurs" (emphasis added).
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increase the probability of reversal if a conviction is obtained, but they
may also increase the probability that a conviction will be obtained. If
the probability of conviction increases enough relative to the increase in
the probability of reversal, the judge who recuses may make it more
likely that the death penalty will be carried out. Both recusing and pre-
siding, then, appear to constitute material cooperation with evil.7
Similarly, if, as Garvey and Coney argue, sitting as an appellate
judge constitutes material, but not formal, cooperation with evil, recus-
ing oneself from an appellate panel may do so as well, by increasing the
probability that a death sentence will be affirmed. This is so because, as
they hint in their brief comment that judges can "find reasons to reverse
even in easy cases," s all judges have some interpretive or discretionary
space when dealing with claims of procedural unconstitutionality in
connection with a death penalty trial or capital sentencing hearing, re-
gardless of the constitutional status of the death penalty.9 A conscien-
tious judge might think that he or she will be more alert than any substi-
tute judge to these problems precisely because of the judge's views on
the death penalty.'0 Recusing will once again make it more likely that
the conviction and death sentence will be affirmed."
My second footnote expands on Garvey and Coney's discussion of
whether a motion to recuse a judge based solely on the fact that the
judge is Catholic should be granted. I have no quarrel with their con-
clusion that it should not. Garvey and Coney say that the inference
from religious affiliation to actual belief is far too weak to make mem-
bership alone something that a reasonable person would think gave rise
7. Although of course a lot will depend on circumstances.
8. Garvey & Coney, supra note 1, at 342.
9. Garvey and Coney overstate the suggestion when they characterize a judge who
searches deeply for reversible error as a judge engaging in "cheating." Id. at 343. A better
word, which they use as well, is "nit-picking." Id. at 343. But, after all, nit-picking is ineffec-
tive unless there are nits to pick. Given interpretive flexibility, an ever-present characteristic
of any complex legal system is that judges ordinarily can fairly find reversible error, particu-
larly if they think it is proper to invoke a "death is different" standard.
10. In this setting, Garvey and Coney's analysis produces an odd structure of hope for
litigants: Defendants would like judges who are persuaded by Garvey and Coney's analysis
to refrain from acting on it, so that they would have a sympathetic judge hear their case and
thereby increase their probability of avoiding the death penalty. Prosecutors would like such
judges to recuse themselves, thereby increasing the probability that a death sentence will be
carried out, producing a result contrary to the moral teachings that motivate the judge's deci-
sion to recuse.
11. I genuinely wonder about the possibility that a judge can insulate himself or herself
from moral criticism even further by participating in the decision up to the point when the
judge's colleagues outvote him or her.
1998]
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to an appearance of partiality. But suppose we switch from a setting in
which all we know about a judge is his or her religious affiliation. In-
stead of thinking of a judge faced with a motion to recuse, consider a
nominee for a judicial position. Assume that Garvey and Coney's
analysis becomes widely known, and a substantial number of Catholics
begin to think that their co-religionists who are judges should ordinarily
refuse to preside over the penalty phase in capital cases. A Catholic is
nominated for a position as a federal district judge. May a senator
properly ask the nominee, "Do you agree with Garvey and Coney's po-
sition about your religious obligations, and if so, do you intend to recuse
yourself from presiding over the penalty phase in capital cases?"
There is a view of the proper scope of senatorial inquiry that would
rule such a question out on the ground that senators should examine
only the nominee's general legal ability and character, not his or her
specific views on any particular matter.12 I believe, to the contrary, that
a senator can properly ask a wide range of questions seeking informa-
tion that will support a predictive judgment about the nominee's likely
behavior, including how the nominee will rule on controversial issues.
Suppose a broad inquiry, though perhaps not as broad as that, is proper.
Is the inquiry into the nominee's position on recusal in light of Garvey
and Coney's argument and the nominee's religion nonetheless im-
proper?
I doubt that either of the arguments Garvey and Coney make
against a determination that a Catholic judge may not preside in a death
penalty case without giving the appearance of partiality bars the in-
quiry. The senator is not seeking to draw an inference from the nomi-
nee's religious beliefs alone; the senator is not asserting that something
follows "simply by virtue of [the nominee's] membership in the Catholic
Church."13 Rather, the senator is asking about the behavioral implica-
tions of holding a belief-a belief that the senator does not know the
nominee holds until the question is answered.'
But what is the behavior in which the senator is interested? It is not
that the nominee might subordinate his or her legal judgment to his or
her religious beliefs, because the behavior at issue, recusal, is authorized
by law. The senator, then, seems to be asking whether the nominee will
12. See, e.g., Bruce E. Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 672 (1989).
13. Garvey & Coney, supra note 1, at 347.
14. For the same reason, it does not seem to me that the senator is moving in the direc-
tion of imposing a religious test.
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pursue a lawful course of conduct once in office.'5 And, even for one
who holds the view that senators may ask a lot of questions, it is not
clear to me exactly why finding out that a nominee will recuse himself
or herself is at all relevant to the confirmation issue.16
I conclude with a point that should be obvious. Nowhere in the
course of their paper do Garvey and Coney identify a single judge who
has recused himself or herself from the capital punishment process be-
cause of the judge's adherence to Catholic doctrine. Perhaps judges
disagree with their analysis of the orthodox Catholic judge's obliga-
tion. 7 I think it more likely, however, that judges simply have not given
the topic much thought. If some judges come to have second thoughts
about their participation in death penalty cases, Garvey and Coney will
have performed an invaluable service.
15. One might analogize this situation to the law of accommodation of religious beliefs
under federal employment discrimination law: it is difficult to see why anyone needs to know
whether a religious believer will seek an accommodation authorized by law, and it is easy to
see why we might be nervous about allowing pre-employment inquiries about the applicant's
intentions.
16. Were such a question to be asked, it might be based on the senator's view that
someone who agrees with Garvey's and Coney's analysis of the recusal question might rule in
a particular way on the merits of issues presented in other cases. Such a senator would then
be inferring a position on substantive questions from religious belief and would be subject to
Garvey and Coney's two-fold criticism.
17. It seems to me that judges should not rely on reasons akin to those offered by Gov-
ernor Cuomo for his position on abortion. Governor Cuomo argued that, to promote social
harmony and leave open the possibility that moral teachings now associated specifically with
the Catholic Church would become much more widely held in the long run, Catholic public
officials should not use their offices to advance those of the Church's moral teachings that
are now highly contentious in the society. Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Mo-
rality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13
(1984). But a judge who recuses himself or herself does not seem to be "using" the office of
judge to advance a contentious moral position.
1998]

